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9 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing by the Director of CIA Subcommittees of Senate
Armed Services and Senate Appropriations - 9 January
1967

1. The CIA Subcommittees of Senate Armed Services and Senate
Appropriations met at two o'clock and continued until 4:30 p.m. Present
from the Subcommittees were:

Richard B. Russell, Chairman
John Stennis
Stuart Symington
Margaret Chase Smith
Carl Hayden
Milton R. Young
Karl E. Mundt

Senator Russell stated he had invited Senators Fulbright, Mansfield and
Hickenlooper to attend and they were present. All members stayed
throughout most of the time. Present from the staffs were:

William Darden
William Woodruff

Present from the Agency:

Richard Helms
Admiral Taylor
R. J. Smith
Carl Duckett
William Colby

John S. Warner

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As usual, no transcript was taken and there was a technical sweep of the room before the hearing and monitoring during the hearing.

2. Senator Russell made a brief statement to the effect that he had a letter from Chairman Hayden of the Appropriations Committee appointing Senator Karl E. Mundt to the CIA Subcommittee of Senate Appropriations. Senator Russell also indicated he had invited three members from Senate Foreign Relations--Fulbright, Hickenlooper and Mansfield--and he wished them to feel free to ask any questions on intelligence matters or concerning the Agency itself.

3. Mr. Helms introduced the Agency witnesses indicating they would be there to assist him in responding to questions. Mr. Helms then read material on the Soviet and Chinese military developments, Chinese advanced weapons, and Chinese cultural revolution from the attached briefing notes. Senator Russell inquired if the intermediate range ballistic missiles of the Soviets were still in place. This was answered in the affirmative. Senator Hickenlooper inquired as to the method of Soviet attack on ballistic missiles. The Director responded that undoubtedly this would be [redacted] from nuclear explosions. In connection with the ChiCom nuclear tests, Senator Russell inquired how we were able to predict these with such accuracy. The Director indicated that it was a combination of intelligence methods [redacted]

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4. On the situation in China, it was pointed out that the Red Guard is split into factions and that the loyalty of the army is not without doubt. The Director indicated there was no way of predicting the eventual outcome. He agreed with Senator Fulbright that if this developed into a civil war it could be dangerous. In response to a question from Senator Fulbright, the Director indicated that Mao is attempting to change those people who could be considered revisionists or who are softening or mellowing. In response to questions from Senator Mansfield concerning the situation along the Sino-Soviet border, Admiral Taylor stated there had been no serious clashes, although there have been minor incidents. Admiral Taylor indicated there has been a gradual reinforcement of Soviet forces across from Sinkiang and Mongolia. However, he pointed out the ChiComs do not pose a serious threat with their present forces. Senator Mansfield asked if there had been any clashes along the Amur River in the Khabarovsk area and Admiral Taylor indicated he did not know of any.

5. The Director then covered the attached briefing material on North Vietnamese positions on negotiations. Senator Fulbright asked about the effectiveness of the bombing, and Mr. Helms then read the insert which is page 29A of the briefing material. Senator Fulbright, noting the judgment that the attacks were not substantially reducing the ability of the North Vietnamese to support the fighting in South Vietnam, asked whether the consequences of a suspension of bombing would have too high a price. It was pointed out that a cessation of bombing would not be a significant concession to the enemy in terms of the rate of infiltration into the south, inasmuch as these trails and roads are not being used to full capacity but only up to about 20 per cent of capacity in any event. Senator Russell inquired if the Agency submitted information relating to targets. The response was that we did contribute overall information but the targeting itself was a military matter with which we were not involved. Admiral Taylor, in response to questions concerning the seriousness of the bombings, pointed out it did put a severe strain on the economy and agriculture. It required 200,000 to 300,000 workers to repair bomb damage and there was also a serious disruption of exports.

6. There was considerable discussion of civilian casualties. Admiral Taylor pointed out that estimated casualties from the bombing of North Vietnam in 1965 were 13,200, of which 45 per cent were civilian, with the general breakdown of 50-50 in killed and wounded. Incomplete estimates for 1966 were 3,800 military personnel and about 10,000 civilians. Admiral Taylor pointed out that the nature of the targeting and the increase in sorties were such that armed reconnaissance caused more civilian casualties than bombing of the targets on the JCS fixed target list. Senator Symington asked if this did not mean that there were more civilian casualties at the least useful targets. Admiral Taylor explained that it was inherent in the nature of armed reconnaissance strikes that there would be casualties among truck drivers, train and barge crews, or work gangs engaged in the construction or repair of highways, rail lines, and bridges, in contrast to the propaganda inference that civilian casualties were women and children. Senator Russell and Senator Hickenlooper referred to World War II experiences both in Germany and in Japan, saying that inevitably there will be civilian casualties in a war.

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Senator Symington stated that it had been charged that Air Force bombing was ineffective and immoral and he stated his view--that he agrees with pilots who have told him that under current restrictions the bombing is ineffective and that they should be allowed to attack more meaningful targets.

7. Senator Russell inquired about the large Soviet helicopters in North Vietnam and Admiral Taylor responded that there were some 26 helicopters there of which about six were MI-6s.

8. In response to a question from Senator Mundt, it was stated there are some 20,000 to 30,000 Chinese in North Vietnam in noncombat units. It was also indicated to Mundt in response to a question that the sophisticated weapons were coming to North Vietnam from Russia and some from Czechoslovakia, and most of the small arms were coming from Communist China.

10. Admiral Taylor stated in reply to a question by Senator Mansfield that enemy main force units in South Vietnam consisted of about 48,000 North Vietnamese and 83,000 Viet Cong. (The Subcommittee was subsequently furnished with a detailed breakdown from the order of battle as of 3 January 1967, showing 44,910 confirmed and 3,100 probable North Vietnamese combat personnel, and Viet Cong strengths of 61,652 confirmed combat, 3,450 unconfirmed combat, and 18,653 combat support personnel, with an additional 160,000 or so paramilitary in the combat, support, and probable categories.) Pointing out that there is a delay of several months in establishing infiltration figures, Admiral Taylor gave the present round figures for 1966 infiltration as 38,000 confirmed, 10,000 probable, and 25,000 possible, which would support a total monthly average of about 7,000.

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11. In response to a question from Senator Fulbright, it was indicated that U. S. plane losses were approximately 500 to date. It was indicated that overall aid from the Soviet Union would total approximately half a billion dollars for 1965.

12. Senator Russell inquired of Mr. Duckett if there had been any increase in the technological effectiveness of U. S. air-to-ground weapons. Mr. Duckett, after giving a caveat that he could not speak definitively to U. S. weapons, answered in general there had been an increasing effectiveness due to training and experience but there had not been any major new developments in weapons.

13. In response to Senator Mansfield's question, it was indicated that Free World shipping into Haiphong had been reduced to about two ships per month--generally British ships of Hong Kong registry, or Japanese.

14. There was considerable discussion of the four points put out by Hanoi, as to whether these were actually preconditions for negotiations, or conditions which must be taken into account in any settlement. Senator Mansfield expressed surprise at the statement that there had been any high-level North Vietnamese indication, prior to the Salisbury interview, that the four points might not be preconditions for talks. It was pointed out that this is not at all clear and there have been contradictory statements. It was agreed we would furnish additional material on this to the Senator.

15. In response to a question as to progress of the war in Vietnam, the Director summarized it by saying militarily it is going well but the pacification program had not gone forward as well.

16. Senator Russell commented on the Laos situation indicating that he thought this was a relatively successful one. Senator Symington endorsed this view.

17. The Director then covered the briefing material entitled, "Rhodesia, South Africa and Sanctions." The Director pointed out that in connection with Ambassador Goldberg's letter which was published in Sunday's POST, that the Ambassador had pointed out to the Director that the operative sentence was that in any event utilization of troops would be subject to Security Council action in the UN with a veto

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available. Senator Russell asked if we had any activities in Rhodesia and the Director stated nothing except intelligence collection which was quite good. It was also pointed out that there is little black pressure internally in Rhodesia. In response to a question from Senator Mansfield, the Director stated that we were giving no support to activities in Portuguese Angola, but that we have in the past had contact with Holden Roberto for intelligence purposes, with the full knowledge of the Department of State.

18. The Director then covered the high spots of the situation in the Congo utilizing the attached briefing. The Director discussed briefly the Agency's operation there including the Swift boats on Lake Tanganyika. He indicated that the rebel problem there is going well and the mercenaries seem to have it under control. The pressing problem related to Mobutu's moves against Union Miniere.

19. In response to questions, the Director then touched very briefly on the Sino-India situation, the Pakistan-India situation, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt. In response to a question from Senator Russell, the Director stated we maintain continuing contact with the supporters of [REDACTED] which was of considerable assistance to the [REDACTED]

Director, in response to Senator Russell's question, then covered Cuba, indicating conditions are about the same with a smaller sugar crop estimated at about four and one-half million tons. There is still an effort to export Castroism, particularly to Guatemala and Venezuela.

21. The Director then referred to the fever chart on Latin American countries indicating nine of the 24 are in varying degrees of trouble. Such countries were: Guatemala, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Bolivia, Panama, and Guyana. The Director commented that the Dominican Republic was coming along reasonably well, but still has serious economic troubles, with continuing

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agitation by the splinter Communist parties. The Director stated that while there are no serious plots at the moment, nevertheless, things could happen there.

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JOHN S. WARNER
Legislative Counsel

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Attachment

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Copy 2 - DCI thru Ex Dir/Compt
Copy 3 - DDCI
Copy 4 - ADDP
Copy 5 - D/PPB w/o att
Copy 6 - [] w/o att

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